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Does Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift in Stock






Abstract. This paper uses a stochastic dominance approach to test for market efficiency following earnings
announcements. We find that the stocks that recently announced good earnings news stochastically dominate
those that recently announced bad news. The results cast serious doubt on any belief that asset pricing model
misspecifications might explain post-earnings-announcement drift.
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I. Introduction
More than two dozen studies have documented that after earnings numbers are announced,
stock prices (net of market-wide movements) continue to drift in the direction of the
earnings surprise for several months (Ball [1992], Bernard [1993]). Such evidence is
consistent with a failure of the market to impound earnings information completely at the
time it first becomes public. However, given how visible and widely followed are earnings
reports, attributions of such evidence to market inefficiency have frequently been greeted
with skepticism. An alternative possibility is that drift in the estimated abnormal returns
represents a premium for some unidentified risk.
Several recent studies have focused on whether post-earnings-announcement drift in
stock prices is best explained as a market inefficiency or a risk premium. Ball [1992, p.
342] argues, largely on the basis of evidence in Bernard and Thomas [1990], that the
phenomenon “seems most likely due to either substantial information-processing costs or
market inefficiency.” However, Ball adds that it is unclear what substantial information
processing costs would prevent elimination of the anomaly, and that the implications of
the evidence for market efficiency are inherently limited by “our substantially incomplete
knowledge of security pricing in a competitive market” (p. 342). In other words, firm
conclusions are rendered difficult by the same joint hypothesis problem first pointed out
by Fama [1970]: that one cannot test market efficiency without simultaneously testing
some model of expected returns. It is impossible to assure that evidence apparently at odds
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with market efficiency isn’t actually an indication of shortcomings in the hypothesized
asset pricing model and its characterization of risk.
This paper deals with the joint hypothesis problem by using a stochastic dominance
approach. Like any test of market efficiency, this approach requires some assumptions
about asset pricing. However, the assumptions are extremely mild. For example, if one is
willing to assume that investors prefer more wealth to less, then first-order stochastic
dominance of one security over another implies an arbitrage opportunity.1 Second-order
stochastic dominance also implies an arbitrage opportunity, so long as investors are
assumed risk averse. Given how weak are these assumptions, a demonstration of stochas-
tic dominance constitutes compelling evidence of market inefficiency.
The ability to test market efficiency while imposing only the mildest of assumptions
about asset pricing comes, of course, at some potential cost. The difficulty is that sto-
chastic dominance demands so much of the data that even gross market inefficiencies may
fail to produce stochastically dominant trading strategies. Indeed, some might doubt that
inefficiencies stark enough to pass a stochastic dominance test could survive in active
markets. Such doubts may explain why stochastic dominance tests have been so rarely
used in the literature. However, if there are instances where stochastic dominance can be
demonstrated, then such evidence should eliminate any reasonable concerns that the
related market anomaly could be attributed to a failure to control for risk.
The tests in this study provide striking evidence of stochastic dominance of stocks that
have recently announced good earnings news over those that recently announced bad
news. More specifically, over the quarter following the earnings announcement, the port-
folio of stocks with scaled unexpected earnings (SUE) in the highest decile dominates the
portfolio in the lowest decile by first-order stochastic dominance. The estimated probabil-
ity of obtaining such a result by chance is less than one-half of one percent. Even after
allowing for 3 percent round-trip transactions costs, the highest SUE decile portfolio
dominates the lowest by second-order stochastic dominance.
More surprisingly, stochastic dominance often holds even between portfolios for which
the SUE differences are less extreme. Among ten SUE decile portfolios, there are 45
possible pairs to be compared; in 35 of these 45 (nonindependent) cases, the portfolio
with the higher SUE dominates the other by either first-order or second-order stochastic
dominance. For the 15 (nonindependent) comparisons of SUE portfolios at least five
deciles apart, the higher SUE decile portfolio dominates the lower by first-order or
second-order stochastic dominance in every case. For this group of 15 comparisons, first-,
second-, or third-order stochastic dominance continues to hold in 14 cases, even after
allowing for a 3 percent round-trip transactions cost. The likelihood of observing such a
result by chance is remote.
The results of this paper cast serious doubt on any belief that asset pricing model
misspecifications might explain post-earnings-announcement drift. An understanding of
this anomaly appears to require either some model of inefficient markets, or identification
of some cost (other than transactions costs) that impede the impounding of public infor-
mation in prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide a brief
overview of the phenomenon of post-earnings-announcement drift, and report estimates of
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such drift within our sample. Section III explains how the stochastic dominance criterion
can be used to discriminate between alternative explanations for the drift. The test results
are presented in section IV, and conclusions appear in section V.
II. Post-earnings-announcement drift
A long series of studies, from Ball and Brown [1968] to Bernard, Thomas, and Abarbanell
[1993], have documented the existence of post-earnings announcement drift. Estimated
abnormal returns have been shown to vary with unexpected earnings, for six to nine
months after earnings become public. The phenomenon is robust; a combination of studies
documents its existence in every single year examined, from 1965 through 1991 (Bernard
[1993], Bernard, et al [1993]). The phenomenon is not explainable as the product of a
failure to adjust for well-known risk factors, such as beta or factors from the APT, nor is
it the product of a number of potential research design flaws, such as beta or factors from
the APT, nor is it the product of a number of potential research design flaws, such as
survivor bias, database restatement and other hindsight biases, or measurement error in
CRSP returns (see Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990] and Ball [1992]).
A tabular description of the phenomenon appears in Table 1. The data underlying the
Table 1. Announcement-Period Reaction and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift for Standardized Unexpected


















1 10,544 22.05% 23.36% 24.99%
2 10,654 21.55 22.61 23.46
3 10,660 20.99 21.64 22.06
4 10,494 20.37 20.58 20.76
5 10,565 0.19 0.16 0.38
6 10,868 0.77 0.68 0.83
7 10,956 1.08 1.14 1.43
8 11,118 1.34 1.37 1.78
9 11,304 1.55 1.90 2.28




Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is equal to the seasonally differenced quarterly earnings, scaled by its
historical estimated standard deviation, using up to 80 observations.
Estimated abnormal returns are equal to raw returns, less the contemporaneous return on a size-matched decile
portfolio.
The two-day announcement period abnormal return includes the size-adjusted return for the day prior to and the
day of the earnings announcement as indicated by Compustat.
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table are approximately 110,000 quarterly observations for NYSE/AMEX firms for
1971–1991.2 Each observation is classified into a decile, based on a crude measure of
unexpected earnings used in many prior studies: the change in quarterly earnings relative
to the comparable quarter of the prior year, and scaled by the historical standard deviation
of that change.3 (We refer to this measure as standardized unexpected earnings, or SUE.)
For each decile, Table 1 presents information about stock price behavior for a 2-day
announcement period, the quarter following the announcement (up to and including the
date of the announcement of the following quarter), and the two quarters following the
announcement. The estimated abnormal stock returns are equal to raw returns, less the
return on a size-matched decile portfolio.4
We examine size-adjusted returns for two reasons. First, our predictions regarding
arbitrage opportunities strictly apply only to abnormal returns net of market movements.
If we were to examine total returns, inclusive of the non-predictable market returns, our
tests would be less powerful. Second, there is evidence that size related returns in January
are already subject to stochastic dominance (Seyhun [1993]). January returns in small
firms dominate the January returns in larger firms by first-order stochastic dominance. By
using size-adjusted returns, we eliminate the possibility that our findings are somehow
caused by the size effect. However, we also replicate our tests using both raw returns as
well as market-adjusted returns. These tests produce mostly similar results and they are
discussed separately.
Table 1 shows that the 2-day size-adjusted announcement returns increase monotoni-
cally with SUE. This simply confirms that earnings announcements convey some new
information. The key columns are those that show the post-announcement abnormal
returns also increase monotonically with SUE. A long position in SUE decile 10, in
combination with a short position in SUE decile 1, produces an estimated abnormal return
of 5.57 percent over the quarter subsequent to the earnings announcement. The estimated
abnormal return continues to increase during the second subsequent quarter, reaching 7.69
percent by the time the second earnings announcement has occurred.
Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990] show that about one-fourth of the post-
announcement drift is concentrated in the three days surrounding subsequent earnings
announcements. This is what one would expect in market with naive earnings expecta-
tions. Specifically, if the market failed to recognize that a change in quarterly earnings
(relative to the prior year) tends to be followed by changes in the same direction for the
next two or three quarters, it would be surprised when (on average) such changes are
announced for the subsequent quarters. In fact, Bernard and Thomas [1990] show that
reactions to at least the subsequent four announcements are predictable, based on current
SUEs, with signs and magnitudes that are consistent with the market underestimating the
autocorrelation in quarterly earnings.5 Bernard and Thomas [1990] argue (and Ball [1992]
concurs), that this portion of post-announcement drift concentrated around subsequent
earnings announcements is unlikely to be explained by a failure to adjust fully for risk.6,7
In this study, we focus on the longer-term (3- to 6-month) drift, where a risk adjustment
explanation is more plausible. It is this longer-term drift that is more relevant for practical
purposes; only over the longer interval does the drift plausibly exceed normal transactions
20 VICTOR L. BERNARD AND H. NEJAT SEYHUN
Kluwer Journal
@ats-ss10/data11/kluwer/journals/requ/v9n1art1 COMPOSED: 05/15/97 9:09 am. PG.POS. 4 SESSION: 12
JOBNAME: Kluwer Journals − GR PAGE: 5 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 11 07:52:25 1997
costs. A number of funds take positions over this longer interval as at least one element
in their trading strategies.
III. Stochastic dominance tests
We now turn to stochastic dominance tests as a vehicle for assessing the likelihood that
unidentified risk factors could explain post-earnings-announcement drift. The stochastic
dominance approach provides a simple method of choice among risky alternatives (Whit-
more and Findlay (1978)). There are three major types of stochastic dominance: first-order
(FSD), second-order (SSD), and third-order (TSD). Under FSD, dominance indicates an
arbitrage opportunity so long as investors are assumed to be non-satiated expected utility
maximizers. SSD demands less of the data to demonstrate dominance, but assumes that
investors are both non-satiated and risk averse. TSD is least demanding of the data, but
assumes investors are non-satiated and risk averse, with decreasing absolute risk aversion.
To demonstrate FSD, one compares the cumulative probability functions of the payoffs
to alternative assets. An asset X with a cumulative probability distribution F1 would
dominate an asset Y with cumulative probability distribution G1 by FSD if and only if
F1(x) , G1(x) for all possible outcomes, x.
An asset X would dominate asset Y by SSD, if and only if F2(x) , G2(x), for all possible
x, where F2 and G2 denote the areas under F1 and G1 respectively. Thus, the cumulative
probability functions F1 and G1 may overlap, so long as the area beneath G1 is always
greater for values less than any given payoff.
Finally, asset X would dominate asset Y by TSD if and only if µF . µG and F3(x) ,
G3(x) for all possible x, where µX and µY are the expected returns to assets X and Y, and
F3 and G3 denote the areas under F2 and G2 respectively.
8
Stochastic dominance results imply hierarchy. FSD implies SSD, which in turn implies
TSD. Hence, a finding that only TSD exists in turn implies that SSD or FSD do not exist.
To implement a stochastic dominance approach, the realized returns to various SUE
portfolios are used to infer the unobservable population distributions. Particularly with
respect to extreme values in the population, any given sample may not provide a good
guide for frequency of population returns. For example, the absence within a particular
sample of an extreme negative return on a high SUE portfolio, even though such extreme
observations are present in the (unobservable) population, could lead one to incorrectly
conclude that such a portfolio dominates one with low SUEs. While this possibility
(sometimes labeled the “peso problem”) always exists, it is rendered less likely in this
study by our use of a large sample that spans two decades.
IV. Empirical evidence on stochastic dominance
A. Main results
Figure 1 compares the estimated cumulative probability functions for the post-
announcement size-adjusted returns to four SUE decile portfolios: decile 1 (lowest SUE),
decile 4, decile 7, and decile 10. The returns are measured from the day after the earnings
DOES POST-EARNINGS-ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT IN STOCK PRICES. . . 21
Kluwer Journal
@ats-ss10/data11/kluwer/journals/requ/v9n1art1 COMPOSED: 05/15/97 9:09 am. PG.POS. 5 SESSION: 12
JOBNAME: Kluwer Journals − GR PAGE: 6 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 11 07:52:25 1997
announcement through the day of the first subsequent announcement. The returns for all
firm-quarters within a given SUE decile that share a given month as the fiscal quarter end
constitute a portfolio, and are aggregated. Since we have data for a period that spans 242
months, each SUE decile portfolio produces returns for quarterly intervals with 242
different starting times. These 242 (partially overlapping) quarterly returns constitute the
empirical distribution for a given SUE portfolio.
Figure 1 shows that the probability of a loss varies substantially across SUE portfolios
1, 4, 7, and 10. The probabilities are 84 percent, 57 percent, 37 percent, and 26 percent,
respectively. The probability of a loss in excess of 5 percent also varies substantially: 36
percent, 13 percent, 5 percent, and 4 percent, respectively. Yet, such large differences are
not necessarily sufficient to guarantee stochastic dominance; dominance tests take into
account differences in such probabilities at every level of return.
In Figure 1, the cumulative probability function SUE decile 10 always lies to the right
of that for SUE decile 1. Put differently, the probability of achieving any given return is
always higher for SUE decile 10, regardless of the level of that return. The higher prob-
abilities are difficult to attribute to chance, based on the non-parametric Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff test.9
Any investor who prefers a higher return to a lower one would prefer SUE decile 10,
regardless of the more specific characteristics of his/her utility function; SUE portfolio 10
dominates SUE portfolio 1 by first-order stochastic dominance. Given how mild are these
assumptions about investors’ utility functions, this represents compelling evidence of a
market inefficiency.
Figure 1. Cumulative density function (CDF) of the abnormal post-earnings-announcement drift, calculated
from the day after the earnings announcement through the subsequent earnings announcement. CDFs are shown
for Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) deciles 1 (lowest), 4, 7, 10 (highest). The decile portfolios are
formed every month from 1971 through 1991, thus giving rise to 242 observations for each CDF.
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First-order stochastic dominance does not hold for the remaining comparisons (10 vs 7;
10 vs. 4; 7 vs. 4; 7 vs. 1; 4 vs. 1). However, in four of five of these comparisons, FSD fails
to hold only because of a small degree of overlap in the distribution functions for extreme
high returns, and SSD does hold. That is, the lower SUE portfolios produce high returns
within certain small ranges more frequently than do the higher SUE portfolios. Since the
higher SUE portfolios dominate over all other ranges of the return distribution, only an
investor with an extreme preference for high returns within the region of overlap would
prefer the lower SUE portfolio. Any other investor, including all investors who are risk
averse, would strictly prefer the higher SUE portfolio. Formal statistical tests of these
propositions are provided in Section D of the paper.
In the comparison of SUE decile portfolios 4 and 1, no stochastic dominance is estab-
lished. The reason is that the higher SUE portfolio produces two returns that are more
negative (232 percent and 227 percent) than the most negative return from the lower
SUE portfolio (224 percent). Even though the distribution function for SUE portfolio 4
lies to the right of that for SUE portfolio 1 throughout the remainder of the return
distribution, the two large negative returns are sufficient to destroy all forms of stochastic
dominance. The reason is that investors with an extreme disutility for the large negative
return might not prefer portfolio 4, even though it produces higher returns with a greater
frequency.
Table 2 Panel A summarizes how frequently stochastic dominance holds for pairs of
portfolios from all of the various SUE deciles. FSD holds not only for the decile 10 over
1; it also holds in ten other comparisons. Note that where no stochastic dominance holds,
it is for comparisons of portfolios with relatively similar levels of SUE. Where SUEs are
separated by five or more deciles, stochastic dominance (either FSD or SSD) holds in 15
of 15 comparisons. Subject to further investigation of statistical significance and the
impact of transactions costs, such evidence is difficult to explain except as the product of
a market inefficiency. High SUE stocks appear to be underpriced relative to low SUE
stocks.
Table 2 Panel B presents comparable results, in the case where post-earnings-
announcement returns are measured over the two quarters following the announcement.
One might expect movement to a longer window would enhance the likelihood of estab-
lishing stochastic dominance, because the longer window captures more of the drift.
However, the drift during the second quarter is not as large as that in the first quarter (refer
to Table 1), and the longer interval introduces more noise. The results indicate that over
this longer window, stochastic dominance holds for fewer comparisons. In Table 2 Panel
B, SUE portfolio 10 no longer dominates SUE portfolio 1. In the comparisons where
SUEs differ by at least five deciles, SSD or FSD holds in 10 of 15 comparisons.
B. Sensitivity tests
Table 3 presents supplemental results based on levels of portfolio aggregation different
from those used in the main tests. In the tests above, portfolios were formed 242 times, by
grouping firms with fiscal quarter ends in the same month. In Table 3 Panel A, we form
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portfolios by grouping all firms whose fiscal quarters end within the same calendar
quarter. Thus, there are only 82 portfolios (one per quarter). This approach would be
relevant to the investor with a longer investment horizon who buys and sells the shares of
all firms announcing earnings over a 3-month period. It also avoids the poor level of
diversification that can occur when grouping by month, for those months (e.g., February,
Table 2. Stochastic Dominance of SUE Decile Portfolios over Lower SUE Decile Portfolios; Portfolios formed
Monthly
Panel A: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Measured over One Quarter
Potentially dominating
SUE decile portfolio: SUE decile portfolio subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 SSD
3 SSD —
4 — — —
5 SSD FSD SSD SSD
6 SSD — — FSD —
7 SSD FSD FSD SSD SSD SSD
8 SSD FSD SSD SSD — SSD —
9 SSD FSD SSD FSD SSD SSD — SSD
10 FSD FSD SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD FSD SSD
Panel B: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Measured over Two Quarters
Potentially dominating
SUE decile portfolio: SUE decile portfolio subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 —
3 SSD SSD
4 — — —
5 SSD SSD SSD SSD
6 SSD FSD FSD FSD —
7 — — — — — —
8 SSD SSD SSD FSD — — —
9 SSD SSD SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD SSD
10 — SSD — SSD — — TSD — —
SUE decile portfolios can dominate other SUE decile portfolios by first-order stochastic dominance (FSD),
second-order stochastic dominance (SSD), or third-order stochastic dominance (TSD). Where no stochastic
dominance is indicated, a dash (—) appears.
Stochastic dominance tests are based on comparison of empirical distribution of size-adjusted returns of the two
SUE portfolios, from the day after the earnings announcement through the first (in Panel A) or second (in Panel
B) subsequent announcement. SUE portfolios are constructed for fiscal quarters ended in each of 242 months for
which data are available during the 1970–1991 period, and thus the empirical distributions are based on 242
observations.
Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is equal to the seasonally differenced quarterly earnings, scaled by its
historical estimated standard deviation, using up to 80 observations.
24 VICTOR L. BERNARD AND H. NEJAT SEYHUN
Kluwer Journal
@ats-ss10/data11/kluwer/journals/requ/v9n1art1 COMPOSED: 05/15/97 9:09 am. PG.POS. 8 SESSION: 12
JOBNAME: Kluwer Journals − GR PAGE: 9 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 11 07:52:25 1997
May, August, and November) in which few firms have fiscal quarter ends. The potential
disadvantage of the approach arises in the form of statistical inefficiency; there are fewer
observations with which to estimate a cumulative density function.
Table 3. Supplemental Stochastic Dominance Tests: Portfolios formed Quarterly; Individual Stocks
Panel A: Dominance of SUE Decile Portfolios over Other SUE Portfolios, formed Quarterly
Potentially dominating
SUE decile stocks: SUE decile stocks subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 SSD
3 SSD FSD
4 SSD FSD SSD
5 SSD — — —
6 SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD
7 SSD FSD — — SSD —
8 SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD
9 SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD FSD SSD —
10 SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD FSD SSD SSD —
Panel B: Dominance of Individual Stocks over Other Stocks in Lower SUE Deciles
Potentially dominating :
SUE decile stocks SUE decile stocks subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 SSD
3 SSD —
4 SSD — —
5 SSD — — —
6 SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD
7 SSD — — — — —
8 SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD — SSD
9 SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD — SSD —
10 SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD — SSD — —
Portfolios (in Panel A) or individual stocks (in Panel B) can dominate others in lower SUE deciles by first-order
stochastic dominance (FSD), second-order stochastic dominance (SSD), or third-order stochastic dominance
(TSD). Where no stochastic dominance is indicated, a dash (—) appears.
Stochastic dominance tests are based on comparison of empirical distribution of size-adjusted returns of port-
folios (in Panel A) or individual stocks (in Panel B) from two SUE deciles, from the day after the earnings
announcement through the first subsequent announcement. Each SUE decile contains approximately 11,500
firm-quarters, and thus the empirical distributions in Panel B are based on this many observations. In Panel A,
firms are grouped into calendar quarters, according to their fiscal quarter end. The are 84 quarterly observations
underlying the empirical distributions examined in Panel A.
Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is equal to the seasonally differenced quarterly earnings, scaled by its
historical estimated standard deviation, using up to 80 observations.
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Table 3 Panel A shows that when we form portfolios on a quarterly basis, the stochastic
dominance results generally grow stronger. FSD holds in nine cells, and either SSD or
FSD holds in 37 of 45 comparisons, including all comparisons where the SUE deciles
differ by five or more. The strengthening of the results is due to the avoidance of small,
poorly-diversified portfolios associated with months with few fiscal-quarter ends.
Table 3 Panel B replicates the procedures applied to portfolio returns, but compares
distributions of individual security returns for stocks in different SUE deciles. These
results “stack the deck” against a finding of stochastic dominance, in the sense that
individual securities expose the investor to risks that would be readily diversifiable within
an SUE portfolio. Nevertheless, SSD holds for many of the comparisons, including the
comparison of decile 10 versus 1, and in 14 of 15 comparisons where the SUEs are at least
five deciles apart. This is a striking result; it suggests that the differential degree of
mispricing of SUE portfolios is so robust that stochastic dominance holds even in the face
of exposure to individual security risk.
As mentioned earlier, we replicated our tests using raw returns as well as market-
adjusted returns. In addition, we used fixed holding periods of exactly 63 and 126 trading
days, instead of the subsequent earnings announcement dates as the ending date. The 63
trading days correspond to a 3-month holding period while the 126 days corresponds to
6-month holding period. For the 3-month raw returns, we found 29 instances of stochastic
dominance out of 45 pairs. Moreover, decile 1 was dominated by all higher deciles by
first- or second-order stochastic dominance. For the 6-month raw returns, there were 38
instances of stochastic dominance out of 45 pairs. When portfolios were separated by at
least three deciles, there were 28 instances of domination out of 28 pairs. Hence, raw
returns exhibit pretty similar patterns as the size-adjusted returns.
Next, we examined the market-adjusted returns. For market returns we used the value-
weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. To compute the market-
adjusted returns we simply subtracted the holding period return to the market portfolio
from the holding period return to the individual stock. Market adjusted returns gave
somewhat stronger results. For the 3-month horizon, there were 40 instances of stochastic
dominance out of 45 pairs. For the 6-month horizon, there were 39 instances of stochastic
dominance out of 45 pairs.
A final note concerns stability of the results. We have implicitly assumed that the
distribution of size-adjusted returns within a given SUE decile is stable through time. To
test that assumption, we conduct tests like those in Table 2 Panel A (where portfolios were
formed monthly), separately for the 1970s and 1980s. The results for each decade are
similar, and are similar to those for the overall period. FSD is found in 11 of 45 com-
parisons during the 1970s, and for 15 of 45 comparisons in the 1980s. Either SSD or FSD
is found in 34 of 45 comparisons during the 1970s, and in 33 of 45 comparisons during
the 1980s. Comparable stability tests were based on portfolios formed quarterly (as in
Table 3 Panel A), and again the results were similar over time.
C. Tests that account for transactions costs
The existence of portfolios that stochastically dominate others before consideration of
transactions costs indicates a market inefficiency in the sense that stock prices appear not
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to reflect fully the available earnings information. However, an interesting question is
whether the inefficiency represents a profitable trading opportunity for investors with
various levels of transactions costs. Here, we consider the impact on the tests of round-trip
transactions costs of 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent. These amounts easily accom-
modate commission fees, which are often less than .15 percent; they also accommodate
the mean effective bid-ask spread of approximately .44 percent (Peterson and Fialkowski
[1994]). When 3 percent costs are considered, they exceed commissions and spreads for
all but the smallest stocks.10 However, large market orders could exert price pressure,
creating a cost not captured by the spread.
Table 4 presents the results. We assume that a shift from one decile portfolio to another
involves transactions costs of 1 percent (Panel A), 2 percent (Panel B), or 3 percent (Panel
C). The introduction of 1 percent transactions costs causes a change from FSD to SSD in
several cells, and from SSD to no stochastic dominance in several others. Nevertheless,
we still find stochastic dominance in most cells and FSD in the most extreme comparison:
SUE portfolios 10 and 1. Of course, the number of cells where stochastic dominance can
still be demonstrated declines as the transactions costs increase. However, even for trans-
actions costs of 3 percent, SSD continues to hold for 13 of the 15 comparisons where the
SUEs are at least five deciles apart, and TSD holds in one of the two remaining compari-
sons. SUE portfolio 10 continues to dominate SUE portfolio 1 by SSD even after ac-
counting for a 3 percent transactions cost. Thus, subject to consideration of statistical
significance, the results suggest market inefficiency, even if it were defined so as to require
profitable trading opportunities after consideration of transactions costs.
We also conducted an alternative test as a check on the influence of transactions costs.
The test was motivated by the concern that, while the above tests assume a constant level
of transactions costs across firms, we recognize that bid-ask spreads and any costs due to
price pressure tend to be greater for small firms. In our alternative test, we repeated the
above analysis while restricting attention to only larger firms (those with market value of
equity in excess of $100 million), and while allowing for transactions costs of 1 percent.
We continue to find either first- or second-order stochastic dominance in 14 of the 15 cells
where the SUEs are at least five deciles apart.
D. Significance tests
Since population cumulative probability functions can be estimated only with sampling
error, there is a possibility that our results are due to chance. To assess the likelihood of
this possibility, we conduct a set of randomization tests. The results appear in Table 5.
The randomization procedure works as follows. We randomly assign (with replacement)
firm-quarters to “pseudo-SUE” deciles. Since the assignment is random, the expected
abnormal returns should be the same for each decile, and one should stochastically
dominate the other only by chance. We calculate the one-quarter-long post-announcement
size-adjusted returns for “pseudo-SUE” decile portfolios (in Panel A) or individual secu-
rities (in Panel B). For a given pseudo-SUE decile, there are 242 portfolio returns (one for
each quarterly period beginning in a different month of the test period); there are 11500
individual security returns. We then compare the distributions of these returns across SUE
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Table 4. Stochastic Dominance of SUE Decile Portfolios over Lower SUE Decile Portfolios, after Transactions
Costs
Panel A: 1 Percent Transactions Cost; Drift Measured over One Quarter
Potentially dominating
SUE decile portfolios: SUE decile portfolio subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 SSD
3 SSD —
4 — — —
5 SSD SSD TSD —
6 SSD — — SSD —
7 SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD —
8 SSD SSD SSD SSD — — —
9 SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD — —
10 FSD FSD SSD FSD SSD SSD SSD — —
Panel B: 2 Percent Transactions Cost; Drift Measured over One Quarter
Potentially dominating
SUE decile portfolio: SUE decile portfolio subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 —
3 SSD —
4 — — —
5 SSD TSD — —
6 SSD — — — —
7 SSD FSD SSD SSD — —
8 SSD SSD SSD SSD — — —
9 SSD SSD SSD SSD SSD — — —
10 SSD FSD SSD FSD SSD — — — —
Panel C: 3 Percent Transactions Cost; Drift Measured over One Quarter
Potentially dominating
SUE decile portfolio: SUE decile portfolio subject to domination:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 —
3 — —
4 — — —
5 SSD — — —
6 SSD — — — —
7 SSD FSD — — — —
8 SSD SSD SSD — — — —
9 SSD SSD SSD TSD — — — —
10 SSD SSD SSD SSD — — — — —
See footnotes to Table 2 for explanation.
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deciles, using the same procedures applied previously. We check for FSD, SSD, and TSD
for each pair of pseudo-SUE deciles. We repeat the procedure 1000 times.
The first row of Table 5 Panel A indicates that FSD obtains by chance only 0.4 percent
of the time. Thus, any given finding of FSD is statistically significant at conventional
levels. In contrast, SSD holds 20 percent of the time by chance. Therefore, our previous
demonstration of SSD for any single pair of SUE portfolios cannot be considered a
statistically significant result at the standard .05 level.
Table 5. Randomization estimates of Probability of Finding Stochastic Dominance By Chance
Panel A: Stochastic Dominance Tests Based on Abnormal Returns to Portfolio






















Portfolio from one “pseudo-SUE” decile
is tested for domination by portfolio
from one other decile
242 .004 .202 .285
Portfolio from one “pseudo-SUE” decile
is tested for domination by portfolios
from each of two other deciles
242 .004 .098 .147
Portfolio from one “pseudo-SUE” decile
is tested for domination by portfolios
from each of three other deciles
242 .000 .044 .067
Portfolio from one “pseudo-SUE” decile
is tested for domination by portfolios
from each of four other deciles
242 .000 .031 .055
Panel B: Stochastic Dominance Tests Based on Abnormal Returns to Individual Stocks






















Individual stocks in one “pseudo-SUE
decile” are tested for domination by
stocks in one other decile
11,500 .000 .121 .196
Individual stocks in one “pseudo-SUE
decile” are tested for domination by
stocks in each of two other deciles
11,500 .000 .039 .061
Tests are conducted by assigning firm-quarters to “pseudo-SUE” portfolios at random. Since the assignments are
random, the null hypothesis of no difference between the returns distributions of portfolios (in Panel A) or
individual stocks (in Panel B) should hold, except for sampling error. Stochastic dominance tests like those
conducted in prior tables are applied, and the presence of FSD, SSD, or TSD is recorded. The process is repeated
1000 times.
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The second, third, and fourth rows of Table 5 Panel A present estimates of the prob-
ability that a given SUE portfolio would be dominated by chance by each of two, three,
or four other SUE portfolios. The estimated probabilities decline from 9.8 percent, to 4.4
percent, to 3.1 percent as the number of simultaneous comparisons increase from two, to
three, to four. The final indicated probability—3.1 percent—would be relevant in assess-
ing, for example, the significance of the finding in Table 2 Panel A that portfolio 1 is
dominated by each of portfolios 7 through 10. Thus, when viewed in isolation, that finding
appears statistically significant at conventional levels.
Ideally, we would report the significance level associated with (for example) finding SSD
in 35 of 45 cases in Table 2 Panel A, or in all 15 of the comparisons where the SUEs are
separated by at least five deciles. Even modern computing power is insufficient to render
randomization of all 45 tests economically feasible. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the
results in Table 2 Panel A are almost certainly not attributable to chance. To see this, focus
on the 15 comparisons with SUEs at least five deciles apart. In the first column, the prob-
ability of decile 1 being dominated by each of five deciles (6 through 10) must be less than
the 3 percent indicated in Table 5 for SSD in four comparisons—and that much can be said
even before taking into account that one of the comparisons in the first column produces
FSD. In the second column, the probability of finding of FSD by chance in all four relevant
comparisons is estimated in Table 5 to be 0.0 percent. The probability of finding SSD in
all three comparisons in the third column is estimated to be 4.4 percent. In the fourth
column, FSD occurs in both relevant comparisons—a finding that should occur by chance
only 0.4 percent of the time. The SSD in the single relevant cell of the fifth column should
occur by chance 20 percent of the time. Given the dependence in the results across col-
umns, it is difficult to know how to aggregrate these probability estimates, but clearly the
probability of observing the conjunction of these results by chance is remote.
To conclude, in those 15 comparisons where power should be greatest, SSD or FSD
holds for every comparison, a result that is almost certainly not attributable to chance. The
results in Table 4, where transactions costs are considered, are not as strong, but an
analysis like that applied above to Table 2 Panel A reveals that the results in Table 4 are
also unlikely to be attributable to chance.
The probability of observing stochastic dominance by chance is lower when individual
securities are the unit of observation, as in Table 2 Panel B, because there are more
observations underlying each return distribution. These probabilities are estimated in
Table 5 Panel B. Although stochastic dominance does not hold as frequently in the
individual security data, it still appears that the results are difficult to attribute to chance.
V. Conclusions
Although post-earnings-announcement drift has been recognized for more than two de-
cades, financial economists still debate whether the anomaly reflects a market inefficiency
or a failure to adjust abnormal returns fully for risk. The results of this paper should
eliminate any reasonable concern that risk adjustment problems explain the phenomenon.
That is, one need not rely on any specific model of asset pricing in order to demonstrate
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the existence of arbitrage opportunity based on publicly available information about earn-
ings. So long as we make the mildest of assumptions—that investors prefer more wealth
to less—then extreme good news stocks dominate extreme bad news stocks. If we add one
other mild assumption—that investors are risk averse—then for SUE decile portfolios at
least five deciles apart, the portfolio with the higher SUE always dominates the other.
Even after allowing for 3 percent transactions costs, dominance continues to hold in
nearly all of those comparisons.
Bernard and Thomas [1989,1990] presented evidence suggesting that post-earnings
announcement drift is not explainable as a product of a failure to adjust returns fully for
risk. Nevertheless, the evidence is not conclusive and doubts remain (Ball [1992]). Ex
ante, it was unclear whether stochastic dominance tests could help resolve the debate,
because such tests are so demanding of the data that even gross inefficiencies could fail
to produce stochastically dominant trading strategies. However, given that stochastic
dominance has been demonstrated here, the results constitute compelling evidence of
market inefficiency.
The above findings suggest that attempts to explain post-earnings-announcement drift
would be most fruitfully focused on reasons why market prices in competitive markets
might not reflect all available information. The reasons are far from clear; most existing
models of mispricing, such as DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman [1990], predict
random pricing errors, not the systematic, predictable errors investigated here. Bhushan
[forthcoming] posits that a combination of costly trading and some naive investors who
make systematic valuation errors could explain the phenomenon. However, this argument
begs the question of why a block of investors would make common, systematic errors in
the first place.
The findings in this paper also serve to illustrate the usefulness of stochastic dominance
tests for assessing the likelihood that a given stock market anomaly is attributable to
inefficiency. Even though stochastic dominance tests are free of all but the mildest of
assumptions about asset pricing, they have not appeared frequently in the literature. One
possible explanation is that they are viewed as so demanding of the data that dominance
would be difficult to demonstrate, even when market inefficiencies do exist. Alternatively,
some might consider it implausible that inefficiencies stark enough to pass a stochastic
dominance test could survive in active markets. The results in this paper indicate that it is
possible to identify broad groups of stocks that stochastically dominate others. In so
doing, the results suggest that stochastic dominance tests would be a useful tool in a
variety of applications involving tests of market efficiency.
Appendix A: Implementation of stochastic dominance
The underlying data consist of a finite set of portfolio returns. Consequently, probability
distributions are defined in terms of discrete observations. The ordered relative sample
frequency f(xi) for portfolio X with K1 observations is defined as,
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f~xi! H5 1/K1, if xi [ X5 0 otherwise, (A.1)
where xi denotes the simple arithmetic returns to decile portfolios. The relative sample
frequencies g(xi) for portfolio Y is defined analogously with K2 observations.
Let N 5 K1 1 K2
i) Portfolio X dominates portfolio Y by first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) if and





f~xi! n 5 1…N (A.2)
and G1(xn) is defined analogously.
ii) Portfolio X dominates portfolio Y by second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) if and





F1~xi21!~xi 2 xi21! n 5 2…N (A.3)
and F2(x1) 5 0. G2(xn) is defined analogously.
iii) Portfolio X dominates portfolio Y by third-order stochastic dominance (TSD) if and
only if F3(xn) # G3(xn) for all n # N with strict inequality for at least one n # N and
F2(xN) # G2(xN) where
F3~xn! 5 1/2 (
i52
@F2~xi! 1 F2~xi 2 1!# @xi 2 xi21# n 5 2…N (A.4)
and F3(x1) 5 0. G3(xn) is defined analogously.
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Notes
1. The stochastic dominance referred to here and elsewhere in the paper is expressed in terms of per dollar
returns. If instead dominance were defined in terms of dollar payoffs without holding constant the amounts
invested in the assets being compared, additional conditions would be required to establish that first-order
stochastic dominance implies an arbitrage opportunity (Jarrow [1986]). In any case, however, arbitrage
requires that claims on the compared assets must trade.
2. The sample is obtained from firms included in the daily CRSP files that also appear on any edition of the
quarterly Compustat files from 1982 through 1987 or 1991. To be included, firms were required to have at
least 10 consecutive quarters of earnings (before extraordinary items) available on Compustat, and the price
data required to calculate the needed returns.
3. Other measures of unexpected earnings generate similar results (Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990]; Free-
man and Tse [1989]). Since the SUE decile assignments could not be made until all firms announced
earnings for a given quarter, there is some hindsight bias introduced here, as first explained by Holthausen
[1983]. However, the bias turns out to be trivial (Bernard and Thomas [1989]).
4. The daily abnormal returns are summed over time to produce the estimates reported here, thus implicitly
assuming daily rebalancing. However, when returns are compounded, the post-earnings-announcement drift
is as large if not larger (Bernard and Thomas [1989]).
5. The autocorrelation in quarterly earnings changes (relative to the comparable quarter of the prior year) tends
to be positive but declining over the first three lags, negative at the fourth lag, and slightly negative
thereafter. Thus, a market that ignored these autocorrelations would exhibit reactions to subsequent an-
nouncements that are correlated with the initial quarterly earnings change in the same pattern. That, in fact,
is what Bernard and Thomas [1990] document in the data.
6. One reason is that the risk shifts necessary to explain the pattern of predictable market reactions (see prior
footnote) would be so complex as to challenge plausibility. Another reason is that the estimated abnormal
returns around subsequent earnings announcements are large per unit time, and therefore explainable only
by risk premiums that are also large. For example, the risk premium around the first subsequent announce-
ment for a long position in SUE decile 10, combined with a short position in SUE decile 1, would have to
be over 100 percent on an annualized basis, before compounding.
7. Ball and Bartov [1993] speculate that a portion of the short-interval, concentrated drift could possibly reflect
some systematic “bid-ask bounce.” If so, that portion of the drift would disappear over longer return
intervals. Bernard and Thomas [1990] and Skinner [1993] report some evidence casting doubt on this
possibility.
8. See Appendix A for implementation of the stochastic dominance conditions.
9. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (K-S) test uses on the maximum vertical distance between two cumulative
density functions to test the hypothesis that they may be generated by the same distribution. The maximum
distance between the empirical cumulative densities for portfolio 10 and 1 is 63.6 percent. The critical level
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test at the 1 percent level is 14.8 percent. (See Neave and Worthington
[1988]). Hence, the K-S tests rejects the hypotheses that cumulative densities for portfolios 1 and 10 come
from the same density function.
10. Stoll and Whaley [1983] estimate posted spreads for NYSE firms to be 0.69 percent for the largest market
value decile, and 2.93 percent for the smallest firm decile. For market orders that execute immediately, these
costs can be reduced by trading within the posted spread. Peterson and Fialkowski [1994] estimate that the
mean effective spread is .20 percent for the largest firm decile, rises steadily to 2.2 percent in the next-to-
smallest decile, and is 6.1 percent in the smallest decile.
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